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Abstract
We study the relationship between exchange rate regimes and economic growth for a sample
of 154 countries over the post-Bretton Woods period (1974-1999), using a new de facto
classification of regimes based on the actual behavior of the relevant macroeconomic
variables. In contrast with previous studies, we find that, for developing countries, less
flexible exchange rate regimes are strongly associated with slower growth, as well as with
greater output volatility. For industrial countries, on the contrary, regimes do not appear to
have any significant impact on growth. The results are robust to endogeneity corrections and a
number of alternative specifications borrowed from the growth literature.
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11. INTRODUCTION
The choice of exchange rate regimes and its impact on economic variables is probably one of
the most controversial topics in macroeconomic policy. However, while its implications
regarding inflation and policy credibility have received considerable attention, the impact of
regimes on economic growth has been the subject of surprisingly little work, probably due to
the fact that nominal variables are typically considered to be unrelated to longer-term growth
performance.2
Even when the economic literature does suggest a link between exchange rate regimes and
growth, it does not provide unambiguous implications as to the sign of this link. On the one
hand, the lack of exchange rate adjustments under a peg, coupled with some degree of short-
run price rigidity, results in price distortions and misallocation of resources (notably, high
unemployment) in the event of real shocks.3 This mechanism underscores the rather
uncontroversial view that fixed exchange rate regimes induce higher output volatility, a point
further supported by the fact that, in a context of free capital mobility, fixed regimes entail the
loss of monetary policy as an independent countercyclical mechanism. 4 In addition, as
suggested by Calvo (1999) and others, the need to defend a peg in the event of a negative
external shock implies a significant cost in terms of real interest rates, as well as increasing
uncertainty as to the sustainability of the regime, potentially harming investment prospects.
However, the implications of these channels in terms of long-run growth performance are less
obvious.
On the other hand, by reducing relative price volatility, a peg is likely to stimulate investment
and trade, thus increasing growth. 5 Lower price uncertainty, usually associated with fixed
exchange rate regimes, should also lead to lower real interest rates, adding to the same effect.
Moreover, (credible) fixed exchange rate regimes are usually assumed to contribute to
monetary policy discipline and predictability, and to reduce a country’s vulnerability to
speculative exchange rate fluctuations, all factors that are conducive to stronger growth
performance.6
Thus, although the literature, if anything, seems to offer stronger arguments favoring the idea
that fixed exchange rates may lead to higher growth rates, in the end, the question of whether
or not there exists a link between regimes and growth can only be resolved as an empirical
matter. The purpose of this paper is to address this issue by assessing the relationship between
exchange rate regimes and output growth for a sample of 154 countries over the post Bretton
                                                
2 A notable exception is the inflation rate. See, e.g., De Gregorio (1993) and Roubini and
Sala-i-Martin (1995), for theoretical models, and Levine and Renelt (1992), Barro (1995) and
Andres et al. (1996) for an empirical exploration.
3 The view that flexible regimes are better suited to insulate the economy against real shocks
go back to Friedman (1953) and Poole (1970), among others.
4 The view has found ample support in the empirical literature. See, e.g., Baxter and
Stockman (1989), Mussa (1986), Broda (2000), Ghosh et al. (1997), and Bayoumi and
Eichengreen (1994).
5 See, e.g., Frankel (1999), Rose (2000), Frankel and Rose (2000). Alternatively, Aizenman
(1994) argues, in the context of a theoretical model, that higher output volatility as a result of
the adoption of a peg may foster investment and growth.
6 See, e.g., Mundell (1995), Calvo (2000a and b) and, for the particular case of currency
boards, Ghosh et al. (2000).
2Woods period (1974-1999). Contrary to what might have been inferred from the literature, we
find that, for developing countries, less flexible exchange rate regimes are associated with
slower growth. For industrial countries, on the contrary, we find that the regime type has no
significant impact on growth. In addition, our tests confirm the standard view (and previous
empirical work) indicating the presence of a negative link between output volatility and
exchange rate flexibility. These results are robust to a number of alternative specifications and
other checks.
Our main reference comes from the numerous empirical papers on the determinants of
growth, from which we borrow our baseline specification. 7 Also close to our work is the
relatively scarce body of literature that directly addresses the relationship between growth and
exchange rate regimes. Among the few papers within this group, Mundell (1995) looks at the
growth performance for the industrial countries before and after the demise of Bretton Woods,
finding that the former period was associated with faster average growth. On the other hand,
Ghosh et al. (1997) run growth regressions controlling for the de jure exchange rate regimes
as defined by the IMF, finding no systematic link between the two.8 We improve upon this
work in two ways. First we use a de facto classification of exchange rate regimes that better
captures the policies implemented by countries regardless of the regime reported by the
country’s authorities.9 In addition, our model specification builds on existing results in the
literature, focusing on the post-Bretton Woods period and expanding the sample size to
include the 90s.
It is important to stress at this point that we do not intend to revisit previous findings in the
growth literature nor to assess their sensitivity to various combinations of explanatory
variables or to the inclusion of exchange regime dummies. We draw on those findings only to
obtain a reasonable set of additional controls to use as a benchmark to test whether the
exchange rate regime has a significant impact on growth. We find that, for the group of
developing countries, this is indeed the case.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 presents the baseline
regressions. Section 4 details the results of selected robustness tests. Finally, section 5
discusses possible interpretations, and concludes.
2. THE DATA
Our sample covers annual observations for 154 countries over the period 1974-1999. A list of
countries, as well as the definitions and sources of the variables used in the paper, is presented
in Appendix 1. With the exception of the political instability and secondary enrollment
variables, all of our data comes from the IMF and the World Bank. Data availability varies
across countries and periods, so that the tests in each subsection were run on a consistent
subsample of observations (which is reported in each case along with the results).
                                                
7 See Levine and Renelt (1992), and Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995), and references therein.
8 However, for some subsamples of countries they find weak evidence that growth rates in
fixes are below those in floats. On the other hand, Ghosh et al. (2000) find that currency
boards, which can be assimilated with hard pegs, tend to grow faster.
9 For completeness, however, we also present results for the IMF de jure classification on
which previous studies were based.
3The classification of exchange rate regimes that we use in this paper deserves some comment.
Most of the empirical literature on the evolution and implications of alternative exchange rate
regimes groups countries according to a de jure classification based on the regime that
governments claim to have in place, as reported by the IMF in its International Financial
Statistics. This approach, however, ignores the fact that many alleged floats intervene in the
exchange market to reduce exchange rate volatility, while some fixers devalue periodically to
accommodate independent monetary policies. To address this problem, we use a de facto
classification of exchange rate regimes, based on cluster analysis techniques, that groups
countries according to the behavior of three variables closely related to exchange rate policy:
i) Exchange rate volatility (se), measured as the average of the absolute monthly percentage
changes in the nominal exchange rate over the year; ii) Volatility of exchange rate changes
(sDe), measured as the standard deviation of the monthly percentage changes in the exchange
rate; and iii) Volatility of reserves (sr), measured as the average of the absolute monthly
change in international reserves relative to the monetary base in the previous month. 10
These variables are computed on an annual basis, so that each country-year observation
represents a point in the (se, sDe, sr) space. In this space, floats are associated with little
intervention in the exchange rate market together with high volatility of exchange rates.
Conversely, observations with little volatility in the exchange rate variables coupled with
substantial volatility in reserves correspond to the group of fixes. Finally, intermediate
regimes are expected to exhibit moderate to high volatility across all variables, reflecting
exchange rate movements in spite of active intervention. Thus, observations are grouped by
proximity using cluster analysis according to the four clusters identified in Table 1.
Observations that do not display significant variability in either dimension are judged
“inconclusives,” and left unclassified.11
TABLE 1
se sDe sr
Flexible High High Low
Intermediate Medium Medium Medium
Fixed Low Low High
Inconclusive Low Low Low
Table 2 shows the regime distribution of the 2188 classified observations, along with the
alternative IMF-based classification for the same group of observations.
                                                
10 For a complete description of the classification methodology we refer the reader to Levy-
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000). The three classifying variables are constructed based on IMF
data. The database is available at http://www.utdt.edu/~ely or http://www.utdt.edu/~fsturzen .
11 Inconclusives, which amount to 637 out of 2825 observations, are excluded from the tests.
They are used, however, in one of the robustness checks reported in section 4 below.
4TABLE 2
Regime LYS (de facto) IMF (de jure)
Float 660 459
Intermediate 598 802
Fix 930 927
Total 2,188 2,188
Source: IMF (de jure) from the International Financial Statistics.
LYS (de facto), from Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000).
While the two classifications show a similar number of fixed regimes, countries within this
group differ substantially according to both classifications. This is due to the fact that de jure
pegs that devalue regularly are classified as intermediates or floats, while countries that claim
a flexible regime but intervene heavily to limit the fluctuations of the nominal exchange rate
are typically classified as de facto fixers.
3. EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES AND GROWTH
A first pass at the data
Table 3 provides a first pass at the data, by showing the means and medians of the rate of
growth of real per capita GDP (DGDPPC) and its volatility (VOLGDPPC, measured as the
standard deviation of the growth rate over a centered rolling five-year period). Observations
are grouped by regime according to both the IMF and the de facto classifications. In addition,
we show the corresponding statistics for industrial and developing countries.12 The table
includes the 2041 observations (out of 2188 classified by the de facto methodology) for which
growth data is available. Since the sample includes many countries which exhibit
extraordinary growth volatility (due to, for example, wars or transition to market economies)
it seems more reasonable to concentrate the analysis in the medians which are less affected by
such extreme values.
Simple inspection of the numbers anticipates the main results of the paper. Fixed exchange
rates substantially underperform floating exchange rate regimes, under both classifications. In
particular, the median annual real per capita growth rate drops from 2.2% for floaters to 1.6%
for the group of pegs, according to the de facto classification. This difference is slightly
narrower for the IMF classification. Note also that the difference in average growth,
consistent with that of the medians when measured according to the de facto classification,
has the opposite sign when based on the IMF. Thus, the de facto criterion appears to capture a
more consistent connection between regimes and growth. 13
                                                
12 Industrial and developing countries are listed in Appendix 1.
13 This may be behind the fact that previous studies based on the IMF failed to find any
significant impact of exchange regimes on growth.
5The aggregate sample, however, masks important differences between industrial and
developing countries. Whereas for the former there is basically no difference in growth
performance across regimes, for developing countries the difference in the median growth
rates widens to 0.8%.
As mentioned in the introduction, economic theory has long associated flexible regimes with
smaller output volatility, as they insulate the economy from real shocks by adjusting exchange
rates, allowing for relative price adjustments and reducing quantity (output) adjustments. This
view has been documented by several empirical studies based on the IMF classification that
find higher output volatility (and smaller real exchange rate volatility) in the case of currency
pegs.14 As can be seen from Table 3, the de facto classification also indicates that output
volatility decreases monotonically with the degree of flexibility of the exchange rate regime.
Interestingly, much in the same way as in the case of growth, this link is entirely accounted
for by the group of developing countries, while for industrial countries, once again, the regime
appears to be irrelevant.
An alternative cut at the data is reported in Table 4. Here, we split countries into two groups,
fast- and slow-growers, according to whether their average growth performance over the
period 1974-1999 was below or above the median. We then examine whether any of these
groups is characterized by adopting a particular exchange rate regime. To do that, we identify
a country as fix (non-fix) whenever it is assigned a fixed (float or intermediate) regime in
more than 50% of its available observations. We find that fixes account for 32% of the fast
growers and 48% of the slow growers, again suggesting the presence of a negative link
between pegs and growth. Once again, this link is entirely confined to the group of
developing countries. Moreover, note that fast-growing developing countries are also
characterized by smaller output volatility.
Growth regressions
We explore the robustness of our initial pass at the data by running a pooled regression for all
country-year observations for which data is available. Since it is not our intention to
reexamine results profusely analyzed in the growth literature, we choose what we regard as a
relatively non-controversial specification of the growth regression, to which we add the
exchange rate regime dummies, INT and FIX.15
Regression results are presented in Table 5.16 As can be seen the control variables behave
largely as expected. Real per capita growth (DGDPPC) is positively correlated with both the
investment-to-GDP ratio (INVGDP) and the rate of change of the terms of trade (DTI),17 and
negatively correlated with the growth of government consumption (GOV1, lagged to avoid
potential endogeneity problems), population growth (POPGR), and political instability
(CIVIL). Initial per capita GDP (GDPPC74, computed as the average over the period 1970-
                                                
14 See references in footnote 4.
15 Our baseline specifications follow closely those reported in Levine and Renelt (1992),
which include the variables most frequently found in the empirical growth literature.
16 Standard errors reported in the table are corrected by heteroskedasticity, since a simple
White-test rejected in all cases the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity.
17 While this variable is generally excluded from cross-section regressions, it makes sense to
include it when, as in this case, regressions are run on annual data.
61973) also comes out with a negative coefficient indicating the presence of conditional
convergence. Secondary enrollment (SEC) and openness (OPEN) are not significant, in
contrast with previous findings.18 In all cases, we include three regional dummies: Sub-
Saharan Africa (SAFRICA), Latin America (LATAM) and transition economies (TRANS), as
well as year dummies (the coefficients of which are omitted for conciseness).19
The coefficients of the regime dummies are consistent with the findings of the previous
subsection. As a benchmark, we show in the first column the result of the test when regimes
are assigned according to the IMF criterion: intermediate regimes grow significantly more
than the rest with no difference between floaters and fixers.20
In contrast, the results based on the de facto classification reveal a different picture. The
regression for the full sample indicates that growth rates are significantly higher for floaters
than for less flexible regimes. Indeed, the coefficient of the fix dummy indicates that fixers
grow on average close to 0.78% per year less than floaters.21 This suggests that, everything
else equal, a country that opted for a flexible exchange rate after the demise of Bretton Woods
would have ended up in 1999 with an output 21% larger than one that chose to fix.
A more careful analysis, however, reveals that the negative impact of pegs on growth is
entirely accounted for by the group of non-industrial economies. In fact, for these countries,
the coefficient of the fix dummy is larger in absolute value than for the general sample,
indicating that the average growth rate of pegs is about 1% below that of floats. For industrial
countries, on the other hand, neither of the dummies is statistically significant, once again
suggesting that the exchange rate regime is irrelevant in these cases.
Output volatility
To explore the link between exchange rate regimes and output volatility, we run regressions
exploiting the links suggested by the growth literature. The volatility of real per capita output
growth (VOLGDPPC) is regressed against the volatilities of the investment ratio
(VOLINVGDP), of the change in government consumption (VOLGOV), and of the terms of
trade (VOLTI), as well as measures of openness (OPEN), initial wealth (GDPPC74), and
political instability (CIVIL). As before, we include regional and year dummies.
                                                
18 See, e.g., Barro and Sala - i – Martín (1995) and Edwards (1991). However, Levine and
Renelt (1992) cast doubt on the robustness of these links.
19 It is important to emphasize at this point that the impact of exchange rate regimes reported
in this paper proved to be robust to the inclusion of many other alternative controls suggested
by the growth literature. These included the inflation rate, primary school enrollment, the ratio
of exports and of imports to GDP, export and import growth, the GDP share of government
consumption, the growth of domestic credit, the ratio of central government deficit to GDP,
among others. The results, omitted here, are available from the authors upon request.
20 For the sake of comparison, the IMF regression includes only those observations that are
also classified under the de facto methodology. Although we use a different sample, these
results are comparable to those obtained in Ghosh et al. (1997), also based on the IMF
classification.
21 Note the similarity between the coefficient of the regime dummy and the difference in the
median growth differential between fixers and floaters in Table 3, despite the fact that the
numbers in Table 3 cover a much larger set of countries.
7The results are reported in Table 6. For the whole sample, the coefficients of all regressors are
positive, indicating that higher volatility in macroeconomic fundamentals is associated with
higher volatility of GDP. The growth of government consumption, terms of trade, the measure
of civil liberties and two regional dummies are all significant.
The table also shows that, while fixed exchange rate regimes are associated with higher output
volatility (as already documented in the literature), a more detailed analysis reveals that this
association is, again, driven by non-industrial countries. As can be seen, the rest of the
coefficients remains virtually unchanged when we move from the whole sample to the group
of non-industrial countries, with the exception of the initial GDP level (GDPPC74), which
coefficient doubles in value. This may be associated to the fact that the more financially
developed emerging economies, which have been subject to considerable external shocks
particularly during the nineties, correspond to the high income group among these countries.
Thus, in contrast with what the literature tells us, the evidence on the relationship between
output volatility and exchange rate regimes is in fact rather mixed. More precisely, much in
the same way as in the case of growth rates, the positive association between fixes and higher
output volatility appears to be restricted to developing countries.
4. ROBUSTNESS
The volatility results discussed above, while mixed, were broadly consistent with the existing
literature and empirical evidence. However, the growth results presented in the previous
section, while also consistent with at least some of the hypothesis advanced in the literature
(and discussed in the introduction), are nonetheless controversial. Thus, it is important to
check the robustness of the growth results and their sensitivity to alternative specifications.
This section summarizes the various robustness checks that we run to address some of the
potential concerns that our findings may give rise to. In particular, we discuss: a) cross-
section regressions covering the whole period, to ensure that the link unveiled using annual
data is not driven by short-term cyclical factors, b) the inclusion of additional macroeconomic
variables to test for possible omitted variables, c) the distinction between high and low
credibility pegs, and d) a correction for potential regime endogeneity.22  We address each of
these checks in turn.
Cross section analysis
The basic motivation for our choice of frequency was the fact that regimes tend to change
rather rapidly over time, making a longer-term regime classification less informative.
However, there is an ample literature that stresses the short-run impact of changes in the
                                                
22 The result survived several other robustness checks not reported in the paper for the sake of
brevity, such as the exclusion of countries with very high or very low growth, the use of
subsamples covering shorter periods, or the exclusion of countries with population below
certain thresholds.
8exchange rate regime on output performance.23 Thus, a potential criticism may arise from the
fact that we use annual data to assess the impact on growth, possibly reflecting the short-term
effect of a change in the exchange rate regime, rather than a long-term association between
regimes and growth.
To address this concern, we estimate single cross section regressions à la Barro (1991), using
averages of the relevant variables over the period 1974-1999, except for the variables
(GDPPC74 and SEC), which are measured at the start of the sample. The main difficulty
posed by this exercise is the computation of the exchange rate regime dummy for those
countries that changed their exchange rate policy during the period.
We test two alternative measures. First we use, for each country, the frequency with which it
is classified as a fix (PERCFIX). Here, a value of 1 (0) would correspond to a country for
which all available observations are classified as fix (float or intermediate). As an additional
check, we use the simple average (LYSAVG) of a classification index that assumes the values
1, 2 or 3 whenever an observation is classified as float, intermediate or fix, respectively. In
both cases, a negative coefficient would indicate a negative association between pegs and
long-run growth. 24
Table 7 presents the results of the single cross country regressions. To confirm that the
findings reported in the paper are not due to differences in the data, we start from a barebones
specification that replicates Levine and Renelt’s (1992) “base” specification, and obtain
comparable results despite the fact that we use a shorter sample period.25 Note also that, when
the regime dummy is added to this basic set of regressors, it is still highly significant and of
the expected sign.
We next take this “base” specification including the regime dummy, and expand the sample to
include the 90s (column iv). As can be seen, with the exception of the investment ratio, the
regressors are highly sensitive to the choice of period. Thus, both initial per capita GDP and
secondary enrollment cease to be significant, while population growth, which was not
significant in the previous sample, appears to be so now. 26 In contrast, the regime dummy
remains highly significant.
Finally, in column (v) and (vi), we go back to our baseline specification (similar to that of
column (ii) in Table 5) but excluding in this case the annual change in terms of trade.27 As can
be seen, countries that behaved more frequently as fixes displayed slower average growth
                                                
23 See, e.g., the extensive literature on exchange rate- vs. money-based stabilization as in
Calvo and Vegh (1994a and b), Kiguel and Liviatan (1991) and Vegh (1992), to name just a
few.
24 Note that the average measure LYSAVG is hampered by the fact that, as the results in Table
5 suggest, the relationship between regime flexibility and growth may not necessarily be
monotonic.
25 Levine and Renelt’s (1992) “base” specification include those variables that are found in
most empirical studies and that can thus be regarded as less controversial (denoted as I-
variables in their paper). For the sake of comparison, in column (i) of Table 7 we reproduce
Levine and Renelt’s results, reproduced from column (i) of Table 5 in their paper.
26 The sensitivity of traditional growth regressors to the choice of sample and the combination
of explanatory variables has already been stressed in Levine and Renelt (1992).
27 See footnote 17.
9rates over the period, a result that is entirely attributable to the sub-group of non-industrial
countries.
For completeness, in column (vii) we report the results of the same regression when the
regime proxy is computed as the simple average of the classification index for each particular
country (LYSAVG), which, as can be seen, yields comparable results.28
High credibility pegs
The de facto methodology leaves unclassified a number of countries that display very little
variability in both the nominal exchange rate and the stock or reserves. It could be argued that
credible fixes are less likely to be tested by the market (hence exhibiting a lower volatility of
reserves) and, possibly for the same reason, more likely to benefit from a stronger growth
performance.29 If so, by leaving out the so-called “inconclusives” we would be ignoring this
credibility dimension and discarding “good pegs,” thus biasing the results towards a negative
association between fixed regimes and growth.
A natural way to address this concern is to include these “high credibility” pegs in our
regressions. Since the de facto approach is silent as to the regime to be assigned to these
observations, we simply classified as fixes all those de facto inconclusives that did not exhibit
changes in their exchange rates, and we added them to our previous sample.30 The two
columns of Table 8 report the results of our baseline regression, this time using the expanded
group of pegs. Column (i) shows that while, as expected, the negative impact of fixed
exchange rate regimes decreases somewhat in absolute value, the results remain basically
unchanged. Alternatively, we include a new dummy (FIXINC) that takes the value of one
whenever a fix was previously classified as inconclusive. The value of this term should
capture any differential effect on growth corresponding to the presence of “high credibility”
pegs. As shown in column (ii), this new dummy is not significant, suggesting that the
distinction between low and high credibility pegs is not relevant.
Additional macroeconomic variables
It may be argued that countries with the worst economic fundamentals and policy track
records are the ones most likely to adopt a peg, either in an attempt to gather some policy
credibility or as a way to reduce the volatility that results from the lack of such credibility. We
do not believe this to be a serious threat to our results, since they are robust to the inclusion of
                                                
28 Replacing PERCFIX by LYSAVG in the other regressions in the Table provides identical
results, omitted here for brevity. Note that, because of the way in which these dummies are
constructed, the size of their coefficients are not directly comparable with each other or with
those in the previous sections.
29 This argument underlies the view that “hard pegs” (economies with a currency board or
with no separate legal tender), are preferred to “soft pegs” (economies with conventional,
adjustable, pegs). On this, see Fischer (2001), Calvo (2000b), Eichengreen and Haussman
(1999). Ghosh et al. (2000) provides empirical evidence in favor of “hard pegs”.
30 Out of the 637 “inconclusives” identified by the de facto methodology, 559 qualify as fixes
according to this criterion.
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nearly all the variables found to be relevant by the growth literature.31 Moreover, the use of a
de facto classification should dispel concerns about fixes faring worse than their more flexible
counterparts due to the presence of currency or banking crises, since failed pegs are by
construction excluded from the fixed exchange rate group.
However, in order to address this potential omitted variable problem we conducted two
additional tests. First, to control for weak macroeconomic fundamentals, we included inflation
(INF(-1), lagged to reduce potential endogeneity problems), and dummies for currency crises
(CURR), and bank runs (BANK). The latter, taken from Frankel and Rose (1996) and Glick
and Rose (1998), and Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), respectively, assign a one to
all countries and periods for which these authors identify a currency crash or an speculative
attack, or a banking crisis.
As can be seen in column (i) of Table 9, all three variables are significant and of the expected
negative sign. While the coefficients of the regime dummies are somewhat smaller in absolute
value, the exchange rate regime remains a strongly significant determinant of growth
performance. This conclusion is further confirmed in column (iii), which presents the results
of a similar test using cross section regressions, where we now included the average inflation
for the period (INF).32
Second, we excluded de facto intermediate exchange rate regimes (column ii). Underlying
this exercise is the hypothesis that slow growth within this group, which comprises countries
with high exchange rate and reserve volatility, is likely to reflect, at least in part, a
deterioration of macroeconomic conditions. This is confirmed by the fact that the three
additional macroeconomic variables included in this subsection lose explanatory power, with
all but one becoming non-significant at a 90% level. However, the negative relation between
pegs and growth rates is not affected by the exclusion of the intermediate group.
Dealing with endogeneity
The previous tests have documented a robust association between fixed exchange rate regimes
and economic growth. However, one may still be worried about the possibility that our results
may be reflecting reverse causation, that is, a relationship that goes from growth to the choice
of exchange rate regime. We believe that this problem should be relatively minor for a
number of reasons. As we discussed above, the economic literature has not associated the
choice of regime to growth performance, nor has it considered growth as a major determinant
of the exchange rate regime.33
One can conceive the case in which the collapse of an unsustainable fixed regime gives way
to the recovery of economic fundamentals and the resumption of growth. However, the
empirical literature on financial crises has long linked poor growth with the occurrence of
                                                
31 See footnote 19.
32 The other variables are also averaged over the period. As before, the change in the terms of
trade is excluded.
33 Edwards (1996) and Frankel (1999) review the determinants of exchange rate regimes, and
growth performance is patently missing from the discussion.
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speculative attacks and currency and banking crisis,34 a channel that is likely to induce a
negative correlation between growth and exchange rate variability, thus going in the opposite
direction of our results. On the other hand, the association between crises and output
contractions may indeed be behind the lower growth rates displayed by intermediates, if this
group is capturing countries under financial distress. Correcting for endogeneity could
therefore strengthen the results for the fixed group while weakening them for the intermediate
group.35
Similarly, (exchange rate-based) stabilizations that induced an output contraction in the short
run may be contributing to create the negative correlation shown by our results. Again,
however, the literature tends to argue in favor of the opposite effect, namely that exchange
rate-based stabilizations has been largely expansionary in the short run.
At this point, it is important to stress that these short-run effects should disappear once we
consider long-run averages as we did in the single cross section regressions above. This
notwithstanding, our analysis would not be complete if we did not address potential
endogeneity problems. In order to do so, we use a feasible generalized two-stage IV estimator
(2SIV) suggested by White (1984). White’s procedure not only provides the most efficient
among all IV estimators, but also allows to correct simultaneously for heteroskedasticity, a
problem that we found present in our baseline specification. 36 The methodology requires
finding instruments for the regime dummies, and implementing a two-stage procedure. Once
consistent estimates of the error terms are obtained, they are used to compute the variance
covariance matrix that allows to compute the estimator that maximizes efficiency while taking
into account the potential heteroskedasticity problem.
In the first step, we estimate a standard multinomial logit model of the choice of exchange
rate regime. To do that, we construct a regime index that takes the values 1, 2 or 3, according
to whether the observation is classified as float, intermediate or fix, respectively, and run a
multinomial logit regression on all the variables included in the growth regression, plus the
following additional controls: the ratio of domestic credit over GDP (DCREDIT), the ratio of
the country’s GDP over the US’s (SIZE), a measure of financial deepening (the ratio of
quasimoney over narrow money, QMM), and the rate of growth of M2 (DM2(-1), lagged to
reduce potential endogeneity problems). Frankel and Rose (1996) show that DCREDIT is
significantly and positively associated with the collapse of an exchange rate regime. The
relative size variable is potentially related to the exchange rate regime by the usual argument
that smaller countries tend to be more open and thus favor fixed exchange rate regimes. Other
authors, notably Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), have shown that the degree of financial
deepening may be associated to the probability of a currency collapse, thus motivating the use
of QMM as an instrument. Finally, an expansionary monetary policy is in principle at odds
(and thus negatively correlated) with the choice of a fixed regime, which justifies the
inclusion of lagged money growth in the first-stage equation. 37
                                                
34 This literature, however, is relatively silent on causality. See Kaminsky and Reinhart
(1999), Hardy and Pazarbazioglu (1998), Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), Frankel
and Rose (1996), Kaminsky et al. (1998), among many others.
35 As we will see below, this is exactly the case.
36 See footnote 16.
37 The inclusion in the first-stage model of additional instruments such as lagged inflation or
the ratios (to GDP) of reserves, government deficit, and M2, yielded identical conclusions and
entailed the loss of some observations. The results, omitted here, are available upon request.
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From the multinomial logit we obtain the predicted probabilities for an intermediate and a
fixed regime (INTFIT, and FIXFIT, respectively) that we use as instruments for the regime
dummies in our baseline specification of the growth regression. This provides the consistent
estimates of the error terms from which we compute the White’s efficient covariance matrix
and 2SIV estimator.38 The results are presented in the first column of Table 10. As the table
shows, the negative association between fixed regimes and growth is robust to the correction
for endogeneity. Indeed, as was expected from the above discussion, the correction increases
the negative impact of pegs on growth, raising the coefficient from 0.8% (see column (ii) of
Table 5) to about 2%, significant at the P = 5.7% level. The dummy for intermediates, on the
other hand, is no longer significant, supporting the view that the original result for the case of
intermediate regimes may have reflected the impact of growth on the probability of a collapse
of the regime, as already explored by Frankel and Rose (1996). The second column of Table
10 includes an alternative model in which we use as second-stage instruments the exogenous
variables used in the first stage (DCREDIT, QMM, SIZE, DM2(-1)), in addition to INTFIT and
FIXFIT. As can be seen the results remain basically unchanged.
In order to obtain a cleaner test of the impact of pegs, we repeat the same procedure this time
excluding intermediates from the sample, and computing a new first-stage estimate (FIXFIT2)
from a binomial (instead of a multinomial) logit model and the same set of controls. The
results, presented in columns (iii) and (iv) of Table 10, show that the coefficient remains
virtually unchanged, and highly significant.
In conclusion, regardless of whether growth performance is itself a determinant of the choice
of the exchange rate regime, the evidence indicates the presence of a strong independent link
which goes from the choice of a peg to sluggish growth.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper tried to provide evidence on the implications of the choice of a particular exchange
rate regime on economic growth. In contrast with previous findings, ours strongly suggest that
exchange rate regimes indeed matter in terms of real economic performance for non-industrial
countries, while this link appears to be much weaker for industrial economies.  In particular,
we found that, for the former, fixed exchange rate regimes are connected with slower growth
rates and higher output volatility, an association that proved to be robust to several alternative
specifications and checks.
While we have not specifically tested the hypothesis supporting the existence of a positive
link between fixed exchange rates and trade surveyed in Frankel (1999), it is clear that
whatever beneficial influence this might have on growth is not sufficient to generate a net
positive impact of pegging on economic growth. Similarly, the alleged gains in terms of
policy stability and predictability frequently attributed to fixed regimes, if present, are at odds
with the higher output volatility that characterizes them.
Of the two arguments mentioned in the introduction that point to a negative effect of fixing,
the idea that pegs may be subject to costly speculative attacks relates to Calvo (1999), who
                                                
38 Appendix 2 shows the exact specification of this covariance matrix, as well as a more
detailed description of the methodology.
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claims that the external shocks suffered by a country are not unrelated to their exchange rate
regime. According to this view, countries that fix the exchange rate are exposed to larger and
more frequent shocks. Thus, the fixed exchange rate dummy may be capturing the effect of
having these additional shocks, much in the same way that the political variables in the
traditional growth equations also capture the implications of additional instability. Two
points, however, cast doubt on this potential interpretation of our results. On the one hand,
these additional shocks were to some extent tested in our regressions by controlling for the
occurrence of currency and banking crises. In fact, while these variables were found to be
significant, their inclusion reduced the size and significance of the regime dummy only
marginally. On the other hand,  “high credibility” pegs, which are not subject to frequent
external shocks, did not appear to fare better in terms of growth than their more vulnerable
counterparts.
An alternative hypothesis is the one that points at a combination of fixed exchange rate
regimes and downward price rigidity that, in turn, may induce an asymmetric response to real
shocks, in the form of output contractions when they are negative and price adjustment when
they are positive. A careful examination of this channel may help understand the links
unveiled in this paper.39
As it stands, the paper opens more questions than it answers. If we accept the results reported
here, one can only wonder why countries have opted so pervasively for unilateral pegs. At this
point, however, one should be cautious not to read in our results the policy implication that
countries should massively adopt floating exchange rate regimes. Fixed exchange rates may in
some cases report substantial gains in terms of credibility and inflation performance,
particularly in a high inflation context. Additionally, the costs of the transition to a float are
not minor and depend heavily on initial conditions. For example, for countries with
widespread financial dollarization, a move to a flexible regime may increase output volatility
due to the balance sheet effect of fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate. Similarly, our
findings are not incompatible with the advocacy of “hard pegs” or full dollarization. Many of
the benefits of having a common currency or undertaking outright dollarization are not shared
by unilateral pegs, transaction costs being just one example. Thus, as much as our results cast
a negative light on fixed exchange rates, they leave open the debate regarding the tradeoff
between hard pegs and fully floating regimes.
                                                
39 Dornbusch (2000), however, disregards this channel as a potentially important factor.
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APPENDIX 1
(a) Variables and Sources
Variable Definitions and sources
DGDPPC Rate of growth of real per capita GDP (Source: World Economic Outlook [WEO])
DM2 (-1) Rate of growth of M2 (lagged one period) (Source: IMF)
DTI Change in terms of trade - exports as a capacity to import (constant LCU) (Source:
WDI; variable NY.EXP.CAPM.KN)
BANK Banking crises (Source: Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache [1998])
CIVIL Index of civil liberties (measured on a 1 to 7 scale, with one corresponding to highest
degree of freedom) (Source: Freedom in the World - Annual survey of freedom
country ratings)
CURR Currency crashes (Source: Frankel and Rose [1996, 2000])
DCREDIT Net domestic credit (current LCU) (Source: WDI, variable FM.AST.DOMS.CN).
GDPPC74 Initial per capita GDP (average over 1970-1973) (Source: WEO)
GOV1 Growth of government consumption (lagged one period) (Source: IMF)
INF Annual percentage change in Consumer Price Index (Source: IMF).
INF (-1) Annual percentage change in Consumer Price Index (lagged one period) (Source:
IMF).
INVGDP Investment to GDP ratio (Source: IMF’s International Financial Statistics [IMF])
LATAM Dummy variable for Latin American countries
OPEN Openness, (ratio of [export + import]/2 to GDP) (Source: IMF).
POPGR Population growth (annual %) (Source: World Development Indicators [WDI],
variable SP.POP.GROW)
QMM Ratio quasimoney/money (Source: IMF)
SAFRICA Dummy variable for sub-Saharan African countries
SEC Total gross enrollment ratio for secondary education (Source: Barro [1991])
SIZE GDP in dollars over US GDP (Source: IMF).
TRANS Dummy variable for Transition economies
VOLGDPPC Standard deviation of the growth rate over a centered rolling five-year period
VOLGOV Standard deviation of the growth of government consumption over a centered rolling
five-year period
VOLINVGDP Standard deviation of the investment to GDP ratio over a centered rolling five-year
period
VOLTI Standard deviation of the terms of trade over a centered rolling five-year period
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(b) List of Countries (154-country sample)
Australia (I) Cambodia Jordan Qatar
Austria (I) Cameroon Kazakhstan Romania
Belgium (I) Central African Republic Kenya Russia
Canada (I) Colombia Korea Rwanda
Denmark (I) Comoros Kyrgyz Republic Saint Kitts and Nevis
Finland (I) Congo Lao People's Dem.Rep Saint Lucia
France (I) Costa Rica Latvia Saint Vincent
Germany (I) Côte d'Ivoire Lebanon Sao Tome & Principe
Greece (I) Croatia Lesotho Saudi Arabia
Iceland (I) Cyprus Libya Senegal
Ireland (I) Czech Republic Lithuania Seychelles
Italy (I) Chad Luxembourg Sierra Leone
Japan (I) Chile Macedonia, Fyr Singapore
Netherlands (I) Djibouti Madagascar Slovak Republic
New Zealand (I) Dominica Malawi Slovenia
Norway (I) Dominican Republic Malaysia South Africa
Portugal (I) Ecuador Maldives Sri Lanka
Spain (I) Egypt Mali Sudan
Sweden (I) El Salvador Mauritania Suriname
Switzerland (I) Equatorial Guinea Mauritius Swaziland
United Kingdom (I) Estonia Mexico Syrian Arab Republic
United States (I) Ethiopia Moldova Tanzania
Albania Gabon Mongolia Thailand
Antigua and Barbuda Gambia Morocco Togo
Argentina Georgia Mozambique Tonga
Armenia Ghana Myanmar Trinidad and Tobago
Azerbaijan Grenada Namibia Tunisia
Bahamas, The Guatemala Nepal Turkey
Bahrain Guinea Netherlands Antilles Uganda
Bangladesh Guinea-Bissau Nicaragua Ukraine
Barbados Guyana Niger United Arab Emirates
Belize Haiti Nigeria Uruguay
Benin Honduras Oman Venezuela
Bhutan Hong Kong Pakistan Yemen
Bolivia India Papua New Guinea Zaire
Brazil Indonesia Paraguay Zambia
Bulgaria Iran Peru Zimbabwe
Burkina Faso Israel Philippines
Burundi Jamaica Poland
An (I) indicates those countries identified as industrials.
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APPENDIX 2
White’s efficient 2SIV estimates
The estimation in Table 10 shows the results corresponding to White’s (White, 1984) efficient
2SIV (two-stage instrumental variable) estimator. This procedure delivers the asymptotically
efficient estimator among the class of IV estimators, even in the presence of a nonspherical
variance covariance matrix (VCV) for the error term in the structural equation. Consider the
structural equation for variable i:
iiii Xy ed += ,
where the matrix X includes both endogenous and exogenous variables. In our specification yi
corresponds to the real per capita GDP growth rate and X includes both the exogenous
regressors in the growth equation as well as the endogenous regime dummy. The White
heteroskedasticity test mentioned in footnote 16 suggests that the VCV matrix of e is non-
spherical, i.e.
W=)( iV e .
As is well known we can estimate consistently our parameter of interest, d, by finding the
value of d that minimizes the quadratic distance from zero of Z’(y-Xd), i.e.
)(')'(minˆ ddd
d
XyZRZXy --= ,
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where Z indicates a set of instrumental variables. R corresponds to any symmetric positive
definite matrix, which must be chosen appropriately, however, in order to achieve asymptotic
efficiency. The estimator corresponding to the minimization problem is:
yZRZXXZRZX '')''(ˆ 1-=d . (1)
It can be shown the limiting distribution of dˆ is
]))')('()'lim[(,0()ˆ( 11 --»- RQQRVRQQRQQpNT dd ,
where
)'var(
'
lim
2/1 eZTV
T
XZ
pQ
-=
=
(2)
Proposition 4.45 in White (1984) proves that choosing R = V-1 provides the asymptotically
efficient IV estimator. In this case, the distribution of the estimator is
))'lim(,0()ˆ( 11 --»- QVQpNT dd . (3)
Thus, if we choose R to obtain the asymptotically efficient estimator, we need an estimator of
V. However, because the e’s are not observable, we need consistent estimators of the errors in
order to construct a feasible estimator for the VCV. Thus the procedure is as follows. We first
run a multinomial (binomial, if the dependent variable is dichotomous) logit regression for the
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regime dummies, our endogenous variables. This multinomial (binomial) logit equation
includes the exogenous variables in the original structural equation plus the additional
exogenous variables discussed in the text, which are correlated with the choice of regime. The
estimated probabilities of the regimes are used as an instrument of the regime dummies in the
original specification. 40 This simple IV estimator is used to obtain a consistent estimate for
the e’s, which are then used to estimate is a consistent estimate of V, Vˆ , as:
T
zz
V t
tttå
=
2ˆ'
ˆ
e
,
which allows for heteroskedasticity. Using Vˆ we can implement the estimator dˆ as in (1) and
compute its VCV matrix as in (3).
                                                
40 We thank Jerry Hausman for suggesting this procedure to us.
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TABLE 3. RATE AND VOLATILITY OF REAL PER CAPITA GDP GROWTH (% PER YEAR)
IMF LYS Industrials Non-Industrials
FLOAT INT FIX FLOAT INT FIX FLOAT INT FIX FLOAT INT FIX
Observations 409 749 883 615 562 864 202 104 120 413 458 744
DGDPPC Means 1.0 2.0 1.2 1.9 0.8 1.5 1.9 1.6 2.3 1.9 0.6 1.4
Medians 1.7 2.3 1.2 2.2 1.4 1.6 2.3 1.8 2.1 2.1 1.1 1.3
VOLGDPPC Means 4.1 3.2 5.0 3.5 4.0 4.8 2.2 1.8 1.9 4.1 4.4 5.2
Medians 2.4 2.2 3.9 2.3 3.0 3.6 1.8 1.8 1.6 2.8 3.6 4.0
Source: IMF’s International Financial Statistics
Exchange rate classifications: IMF, de jure from IFS, LYS de facto from Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000)
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TABLE 4. FAST AND SLOW GROWERS
Full Sample
FAST
GROWERS
SLOW
GROWERS
P-value
Observations 77 77
DGDPPC Means 3.23 -0.34
Medians 2.59 -0.07
PERCFIX Means 0.32 0.48 0.049 1
VOLGDPPC Means 3.91 4.57 0.141 1
Medians 3.16 4.32 0.003 2
Mean growth rate (whole sample): 1.45
Industrials
FAST
GROWERS
SLOW
GROWERS
P-value
Observations 11 11
DGDPPC Means 2.63 1.38
Medians 2.34 1.66
PERCFIX Means 0.36 0.27 0.666 1
VOLGDPPC Means 2.05 1.97 0.752 1
Medians 1.85 1.99 0.896 2
Mean growth rate (whole sample): 2.01
Non-Industrials
FAST
GROWERS
SLOW
GROWERS
P-value
Observations 66 66
DGDPPC Means 3.31 -0.60
Medians 2.66 -0.16
PERCFIX Means 0.30 0.53 0.008 1
VOLGDPPC Means 4.32 4.86 0.269 1
Medians 3.42 4.50 0.017 2
Mean growth rate (whole sample): 1.35
1 corresponds to a t-test of equality of means
2 corresponds to a Wilcoxon / Mann-Whitney test of equality of medians
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TABLE 5. GROWTH REGRESSIONS  (ANNUAL DATA)
(i ) (ii ) (iii ) (iv )
IMF
Baseline
LYS
Baseline
LYS
Industrial
LYS
Non-industrial
INVGDP 9.26*** 8.67*** 7.28** 10.34***
1.89 1.88 3.03 2.45
POPGR -0.40** -0.46*** -0.69** -0.43**
0.16 0.15 0.32 0.17
GDPPC74 -0.34*** -0.38*** -0.24** -0.53*
0.13 0.12 0.11 0.28
GOV1 -1.27*** -1.13*** 2.95 -1.23***
0.40 0.40 2.07 0.42
SEC -0.65 -0.71 2.72** 0.20
0.97 0.95 1.35 1.32
CIVIL -0.24* -0.26** -0.57** -0.24*
0.12 0.12 0.23 0.14
DTI 5.15*** 5.21*** 6.16** 5.27***
1.02 1.02 2.46 1.02
OPEN -0.61 -0.13 0.74 -1.30
0.81 0.82 0.93 0.82
SAFRICA -0.76* -0.94** -0.78
0.45 0.46 0.49
LATAM -0.93*** -0.96*** -0.97***
0.34 0.34 0.36
TRANS -0.90 -1.59 -2.17
1.85 1.74 1.79
INT 0.68** -0.98*** -0.43 -1.17***
0.29 0.29 0.28 0.38
FIX -0.16 -0.78*** -0.06 -1.04***
0.41 0.28 0.30 0.40
Obs. 1349 1349 387 962
R2 0.201 0.203 0.382 0.200
***, **, and * represent 99, 95 and 90% significance. Heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard errors in italics.
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TABLE 6. OUTPUT VOLATILITY REGRESSIONS (ANNUAL DATA)
(i) (ii ) (iii )
Whole sample Industrials Non-industrials
GDPPC74 0.18** 0.10 0.42***
0.08 0.10 0.14
VOLINVGDP 0.09 14.63 -1.14
3.44 9.17 3.61
VOLGOV 1.7*** 16.03** 1.68***
0.61 6.25 0.59
VOLTI 0.01* -0.07 0.01
0.004 0.55 0.004
OPEN 1.69*** 1.58*** 1.35**
0.49 0.57 0.56
CIVIL 0.57*** 0.17 0.51***
0.09 0.22 0.11
SAFRICA 0.31 0.28
0.36 0.38
LATAM 0.69*** 0.43
0.21 0.29
TRANS 1.91*** 1.3**
0.56 0.63
INT 0.15 -0.49** 0.26
0.29 0.21 0.34
FIX 0.57** 0.03 0.71**
0.26 0.24 0.32
Obs. 1091 140 951
R2 0.141 0.618 0.113
***, **, and * represent 99, 95 and 90% significance. Heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors in italics.
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TABLE 7. SINGLE CROSS SECTION GROWTH REGRESSIONS
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
LR 1
1960-1989 1974-1989 1974-1989 1974-1999 1974-1999
Non
Industrials
1974-1999 1974-1999
INVGDP 17.49** 14.15*** 15.78*** 13.61*** 8.80*** 10.19*** 8.46***
2.68 3.03 3.01 2.46 2.97 3.42 2.96
POPGR -0.38 -0.28 -0.28  -0.64*** -0.59*** -0.70*** -0.60***
0.22 0.24 0.23 0.14 0.18 0.21 0.18
GDPPC74  -0.35**  -0.42**  -0.39* -0.08 -0.23 -0.06 -0.24
0.14 0.20 0.20 0.14 0.16 0.24 0.16
GOV1 -1.16 -1.59* -0.91
0.84 0.91 0.82
SEC 3.17** 3.20*** 2.43** -0.005 -0.02 -0.03** -0.02
1.29 1.17 1.18 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
CIVIL -0.14 -0.05 -0.14
0.19 0.21 0.19
OPEN 1.05 1.25 1.30
0.99 1.31 1.02
SAFRICA -1.02** -0.91* -1.04**
0.48 0.52 0.47
LATAM -0.73 -0.55 -0.74*
0.44 0.52 0.44
TRANS -0.39 0.01 -0.72
1.41 1.56 1.41
PERCFIX  -1.12** -1.33*** -1.31*** -2.27***
0.44 0.42 0.47 0.64
LYSAVG -0.77***
0.27
Obs. 101 86 86 101 96 74 96
R2 0.46 0.398 0.441 0.425 0.481 0.547 0.481
***, **, and * represent 99, 95 and 90% significance. Standard errors in italics.
1 Levine and Renelt (1992), column (i) of table 5
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TABLE 8. INCLUDING HIGH CREDIBILITY PEGS
(i) (ii )
Are high Credibility
Pegs Different?
INVGDP 9.78*** 9.77***
1.73 1.73
POPGR -0.48*** -0.48***
0.15 0.15
GDPPC74 -0.47*** -0.47***
0.14 0.14
GOV1 -1.15*** -1.14***
0.39 0.39
SEC 0.06 0.07
0.97 0.97
CIVIL -0.16 -0.16
0.11 0.11
DTI 5.42*** 5.43***
0.94 0.94
OPEN -1.00 -0.97
0.80 0.82
SAFRICA -1.24*** -1.23***
0.42 0.42
LATAM -0.89*** -0.89***
0.30 0.30
TRANS -1.70 -1.70
1.72 1.72
INT -0.93*** -0.93***
0.29 0.29
FIX -0.59** -0.62**
0.25 0.27
FIXINC 0.08
0.39
Obs. 1572 1572
R2 0.204 0.204
***, **, and * represent 99, 95 and 90% significance.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in italics.
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TABLE 9. INCLUDING ADDITIONAL MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES
(i) (ii) (iii)
Baseline
specification
Baseline  specification
w/o intermediates
Single cross section 1
INVGDP 8.10*** 5.25** 9.13**
1.94 2.04 3.48
POPGR -0.36*** -0.33** -0.59***
0.13 0.13 0.20
GDPPC74 -0.26** -0.08 -0.11
0.11 0.12 0.18
GOV1 0.30 -0.32 3.69*
0.77 1.23 2.21
SEC -0.57 -0.91 -0.02
0.94 1.13 0.01
CIVIL -0.15 -0.12 -0.12
0.13 0.15 0.19
DTI 4.87*** 5.02***
1.09 1.32
OPEN 0.11 1.19 0.87
0.80 0.92 0.93
INF(-1) -0.02* 0.002
0.01 0.010
INF -0.04**
0.02
CURR -1.75*** -2.08** 2.42
0.55 0.87 3.20
BANK -1.12** -0.10 -1.17
0.44 0.47 1.12
SAFRICA -1.21*** -0.86* -0.70
0.46 0.48 0.53
LATAM -0.77** -0.91** -0.71
0.35 0.39 0.49
TRANS -1.01 0.46 -0.96*
1.78 1.33 0.55
INT -0.85***
0.26
FIX -0.57** -0.64**
0.28 0.28
PERCFIX -1.39***
0.49
Obs. 1268 876 95
R2 0.217 0.182 0.489
***, **, and * represent 99, 95 and 90% significance. Heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard errors in italics. 1 INVGDP, POPGR, GOV1, CIVIL, OPEN, INF, CURR,
BANK are period averages.
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TABLE 10. ACCOUNTING FOR ENDOGENEITY
(i)
Baseline
specification
(ii)
Baseline
specification
(iii)
Baseline  specification
w/o Intermediates
(iv)
Baseline  specification
w/o intermediates
INVGDP 8.58*** 8.71*** 3.96** 3.35*
2.00 2.07 1.99 1.99
POPGR -0.47*** -0.47*** -0.53*** -0.50***
0.16 0.13 0.17 0.17
GDPPC74 -0.40** -0.30** -0.10 -0.10
0.16 0.15 0.20 0.20
GOV1 -1.29*** -0.98*** -0.29 0.52
0.47 0.38 0.76 0.76
SEC -0.33 -0.63 -1.38 -1.86
1.17 1.06 1.28 1.28
CIVIL -0.25** -0.32*** -0.23 -0.28*
0.12 0.12 0.14 0.14
LATAM -0.79** -0.58* -0.72* -0.86**
0.34 0.36 0.16 0.40
SAFRICA -0.43 0.22 0.04 0.02
0.56 0.64 0.33 0.57
TRANS -1.77 -1.11
1.80 1.69
DTI 5.39*** 5.66*** 5.59*** 5.40***
1.04 1.03 1.24 1.24
OPEN 0.29 1.42 2.42* 2.92**
1.45 1.39 1.29 1.29
INT -0.87 -0.88
1.58 1.19
FIX -1.83* -2.51** -2.37*** -2.21***
1.03 1.07 0.81 0.81
N° of observations 1278 1278 878 878
***, **, and * represent 99, 95 and 90% significance. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard
errors in italics.
(i) Instruments: INTFIT and FIXFIT, where INTFIT and FIXFIT are the estimates of INT
and FIX in a multinomial logit model
(ii) Instruments: INTFIT, FIXFIT, QMM, DCREDIT, SIZEUS and DM2(-1)
(iii) Instruments: FIXFIT2, where FIXFIT2 is the estimate of  FIX in a logit model over the
sample excluding intermediates
(iv) Instruments: FIXFIT2, QMM, DCREDIT, SIZEUS and DM2(-1)
